The Trade-Off between Equal Representation and Electoral Participation: The Effect of Redistricting on Voter Turnout
In: Representation, Band 58, Heft 4, S. 547-563
ISSN: 1749-4001
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In: Representation, Band 58, Heft 4, S. 547-563
ISSN: 1749-4001
In: Asian politics & policy: APP, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 402-426
ISSN: 1943-0787
Political parties seek to make optimal nominations of candidates to maximize the number of seats they may win. In a multimember district with a single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral system, parties need to run the optimal number of candidates in each electoral district. If too many or too few candidates run, they may lose seats they might otherwise have won. In this situation, district‐level party organizations face a collective action problem: they do not have the incentive to run multiple candidates for fear of losing all seats, despite needing to do so in order for the party to win a majority of seats in a legislature. This study examines the factors that enable parties to run multiple candidates in SNTV districts, and shows that parties undertake this action when they are able to divide the vote between party candidates on the basis of geography in the case of Japan.
In: The journal of legislative studies, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 153-174
ISSN: 1743-9337
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 209-221
ISSN: 1354-0688
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 209-221
ISSN: 1460-3683
This study aims to offer empirical evidence of how electoral systems influence the way legislators represent their constituencies. In particular, it analyses the influence of electoral systems on legislators' representations in terms of a pattern of policy areas represented by them. By comparing legislators' behaviour under Japan's multi-member district, single non-transferable vote and single-member district systems, I demonstrate that electoral systems with higher district magnitude (i.e. higher number of seats per district) are more likely to offer electoral incentives for legislators to represent specific benefits, including particularistic interests in targeted policy areas. On the other hand, electoral systems with lower district magnitude are more likely to provide electoral incentives for representing diverse benefits, including general interests in various policy areas.
In: European political science review: EPSR, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 147-175
ISSN: 1755-7747
Political parties are often faced with seemingly opposing goals when trying to secure members' reelection and maintain party unity. On one hand, a party needs to fulfill members' diverse electoral needs for their reelection, and on the other hand, the party must force members to vote in unison according to party lines for collective decisions. How does a party influence its members to take unified action while meeting their individual electoral needs? Through an analysis of the Japanese Diet, this study argues that parties attempt to achieve the reelection of their members and maintain party unity by manipulating legislative committee assignments and deliberations. In particular, the study demonstrates that a party shapes committees in a different way according to policy areas over which committees have jurisdiction. A party tends to accept its members' requests for affiliation and allow their self-management in committees concerned with particularistic benefits so that they can deliver specific benefits to each electoral district. In addition, a party tends to assign members who have average policy positions in the party to committees concerned with general benefits to make policies that satisfy many constituencies.
In: Japanese journal of political science, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 175-190
ISSN: 1474-0060
AbstractThis article discusses the effects of executive leadership on fiscal policies and performance. I propose that executive leadership, as a political entrepreneur who provides collective goods for organization, has incentives to maintain fiscal discipline so that he or she can stay in office by developing his or her party's reputation and leading party legislators to electoral success. This article argues that executive leadership with stronger public support is more likely to restrain fiscal expenditure and maintain fiscal discipline. I demonstrate this argument by showing that the prime minister who receives higher public support is more likely to restrain fiscal expenditure in Japan.
In: Japanese journal of political science, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 233
ISSN: 1474-0060
In: Political science research and methods: PSRM, S. 1-22
ISSN: 2049-8489
Abstract
Do policy priorities that candidates emphasize during election campaigns predict their subsequent legislative activities? We study this question by assembling novel data on legislative leadership posts held by Japanese politicians and using a fine-tuned transformer-based machine learning model to classify policy areas in over 46,900 statements from 1270 candidate manifestos across five elections. We find that a higher emphasis on a policy issue increases the probability of securing a legislative post in the same area. This relationship remains consistent across multiple elections and persists even when accounting for candidates' previous legislative leadership roles. We also discover greater congruence in distributive policy areas. Our findings indicate that campaigns provide meaningful signals of policy priorities.
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 75-102
ISSN: 1939-9162
Committee chairs hold crucial positions in the legislative process and can push or quell legislative initiatives. While extant studies examine the formal powers and legislative consequences of committee chairs, we know less about their appointment. We examine who ruling parties (principal) appoint to committee chairs (agent) in order to minimize the risk of policy moving away from government positions. Using data from Japan (2003–2017) on the LDP, we test expectations derived from the principal‐agent framework, conditional on committee type. Japan makes an ideal case to study intraparty chair appointments due to its coalitions' office‐allocation patterns. We find that the party leadership appoints as chairs ideologically close MPs to committees with jurisdiction on high policy. However, we find no effect for chair appointments on particularistic committees. Using additional data on bill‐amendment rates, we emphasize the legislative consequences of political appointments in the legislative process.
In: Journal of east Asian studies, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 409-441
ISSN: 2234-6643
Although party polarization is one of the most significant focal points in the study of contemporary US politics, a limited number of studies have examined its theoretical implications for other countries. In addition, a great deal of effort has been made in the study of the changes in voting bases (i.e., constituencies or interest groups). However, little attention has been given to the features of party organization. In this study we look at the process of polarization between two major parties in Japan in recent years and analyze the way Japanese parties took an alternative path to polarization. We argue that party polarization can be caused by the strategic position-taking of the party executive in addition to the centralization of the party organization.
In: Journal of east Asian studies, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 409-442
ISSN: 1598-2408
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